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NIGERIAN TIN MINING AND IMPERIALISM: FROM THE NIGER
COMPANY TO ATMN
Bill Freund
As a number of writers have pointed out in recent years,
(Kiernan, Warren), there are considerable problems in
assessing the relationship between the rise of finance
capital and imperial rivalry and conquest so narrowly
juxtaposed by Lenin. In particular, evidence suggests that
changes in the structure of capital in late nineteenth cen-
tury Europe can only be correlated indirectly with the
imperial forward movement in Africa. The two principal
imperial powers involved in West Africa, Britain and France,
were among the last capitalist states to witness the
development of monopolies on the German model and there was
much continuity with earlier patterns in the history of
their advance into the interior" of the continent. Even if
we assume that narrowly economic motives were primary in
motivating the Scramble for Africa, they cannot be understood
purely in terms of finance capital nor can they be divorced
from the fundamental capitalist labour and production
process. Colonial expansion did correspond more precisely
to significant technological changes in European industry,
notably the rise of precision engineering (which formed the
basis for great advances in weaponry) and the invention of
a great range of cheap consumer products with new raw
material requirements. Closely allied to these developments
in turn was the so-called transport revolution.
The fundamental feature governing the conquest of West
Africa by Europeans was the need for capital to overcome the
barriers to its advance posed by pre-capitalist ruling
strata that were unable either technologically or socially
to accommodate such an advance. These barriers affected
the possibility of realising expanded profits for capitalist
production in Europe through commerce but they were even
more consequential from the point of view of the development
of capitalist production in Africa itself. This interpre-
tation flows from a Marxist reading of A.G. Hopkins'
Economic History of West Africa , in particular his discus-
sion of commercial crisis on the West African coast from the
1870s. it also bears comparison with the recent assessment
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by Marks and Trapido of the Boer War and Milnerite
reconstruction in the Transvaal.1
Before the dominant forms of late nineteenth/early
twentieth century capitalism could establish any real
purchase on tropical Africa, a transitional process needed
to take place. This process bore some of the hallmarks of
the long phase Marx had described for the West as primitive
accumulation. In Africa, the beginnings of an equivalent
historical development took place under the aegis of conquest
and through interconnection with an already highly articular
ted capitalist system in Europe, giving it a somewhat
different character. This process was dramatised through
its rapidity and extreme brutality in the history of
Leopold II's Congo Free State; elsewhere it took place more
gradually. The deep involvement of finance capital impinged
with particular intensity and success in the Congo because
of the early exploitation of important mineral resources,
well under way on the eve of World War I. Mining attracted
much the lion's share of capital investment in colonial
Africa as a whole and therefore deserves particularly careful
attention in the history of capital penetration in Africa.
Economic necessity did not exactly determine the timing
and organisation of the Scramble for Africa, however. From
the point of view of capital penetration, much of the
partition was premature and perhaps overly hasty. Political
developments followed the specific course of crises in Africa
and the rivaries of European states. Yet fierce as those
inter-state rivalries were, it should not be forgotten that
the conquest of Africa had as well a cooperative aspect.
French and German investors and merchants profited after all
from the British conquest of Nigeria or the Transvaal which
placed capitalist enterprise on a sound basis, even though
British capital might thereby derive particular advantages.
Northern Nigeria was rather typically an area conquered
presumably from a strictly economic point of view. Its
occupation from 1900 served above all to forestall French
or German advances on the Niger and Benue. From the point
of view of division of labour, of the commoditisation of
a substantial surplus or the well-articulated social forms
of a class society, the territories under the hegemony of
the Sokoto Caliphate were among the most highly developed
in all of Africa. However, they did not yield in 1900 an
obvious surplus of desirable goods for Western industry,
nor did they provide a ready market for imported articles
of any great substance. The West African savanna was a
difficult and unattractive prospect for coastal merchant
firms to penetrate. Not for nearly a decade after its
surrender to British arms in 1903 did Kano, the "Manchester
of West Africa", receive the first canteens of the Niger
Company and other big firms outside its walls; this required
the construction of a railway from the port of Lagos.
The contrast is especially striking with Southern Nigeria.
Whereas, in the south, the British adminstration could live
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off customs revenue, primarily liquor imports, and even
maintain at times a handsome surplus, its northern
equivalent, even while forcing the peasantry to pay taxes
at the onerous rates exacted by emirs in the past on a
more systematic cash basis, ran a large deficit until the
end of World War I. This was, of course the reason why
North and South were amalgamated into one central financial
unit in 1914.
The difficulties involved in converting the West African
surplus into one that could feed the circuit of capital can
be exemplified in the pre-colonial tin mining industry
of Northern Nigeria.2 As early as the jihad period,
Muhammad Bello mentioned tin as a product of Ririwai in the
Infag at Maisuri and it was no doubt mined for centuries
before that. Tin mining was a specialty of the town of
Ririwain Kano, in the extreme south of Kano emirate. In
the mid-nineteenth century, a second Ririwai was settled
further south under the jurisdiction of the emirate of
Bauchi at the foot of the Jos Plateau escarpment. Other
mining sites (and perhaps smelting sites) existed but it
appears that little mining was done above Ririwain Bauchi
(also called Ririwain Dalma) on the Plateau itself which
lay outside the hegemony of Sokoto and had only marginal
commercial links to the plains below.
Most tin was gathered in streams and washed but in
Ririwain Kano, at least, there were underground galleries
and systematic mining operations. Tin was smelted in the
Ririwais and brought by merchants to craft centres, notably
Kano, Bauchi and Bida, where smiths worked it into various
objects largely for luxury consumption (horsegear, jewelry,
ornamental plates). Smelter-owners (who also constituted
the political office-holders of the smelting towns),
merchants and the state, which taxed mining operations,
shared the surplus. The social forms of labour working
tin varied. Dependent household labour, wage labour and
slave labour were all used. The two Ririwais were
characterised by a high degree of specialised production
but it seems likely that they were largly self-sufficient
in food and even some handicraft needs. Tin mining was in
good part a seasonal activity and it was largely
incorporated into the household economy as a whole.
From the early 1880s, the Royal Niger Company agents on
the Benue identified tin purchased from House merchants as
a local product. This precipitated a substantial increase
in mining and smelting in Ririwain Bauchian sales expanded.
Nonetheless, before imperial conquest, the tin resources of
Northern Nigeria, only moderately interested Western capital
The price on the Benue was too elevated to compete with
supplies from elsewhere in the world, given the cost of
transport, and surplus absorbed locally. In fact, following
the conquest, local tin production was quickly undercut
by cheap imported scrap from the West. Urban smiths came
to depend on the like of cigar boxes for supplies. It was
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moreover, impossible for human porterage (donkeys could
also be used in the dry season) to bear a very substantial
quantity of ore down to the Benue. The labour demands of
large-scale tin workings required a huge workforce that
pre-capitalist social structures in the savanna did not have
available for the taking. The British did not conquer
Northern Nigeria for its tin but it was only the conquest
which made its exploitation, on a suitable basis for
capital, possible.
Tin metal has a considerable range of uses in alloy and
most of them hinge on the production of consumer durable
goods characteristic of the "Second Industrial Revolution"
of the late nineteenth century. This era saw a great exten-
sion in the use of the tin can, a somewhat earlier inven-
tion which proved fundamental in the modern use of the
metal. Its relative scarcity precipitated a great
expansion of world tin mining and made tin the most
expensive of the commoner industrial metals. By 1870,
Britain, principal tin mining and consuming country in
Europe, was beginning to require extensive imports. As
British tin consumption levelled off towards the turn of
the century, US consumption continued to grow rapidly.
Thus the financial prospects for new tin mines were excel-
lent in the early years of the twentieth century. When in
1910 mining leases became available commercially on the
Jos Plateau, dozens of syndicates were floated in London,
behind which often sat cross-cutting directorates, which
sought to share the risks involved in speculative mining
ventures. By July, 1911, some £3m. had been placed in
Nigerian tin mining shares on the London Stock Exchange and
for much of that year they were the most actively traded
shares.3 A second boom in 1913-14 brought the paper
investment to some £10m. with some 200 companies involved.
This investment, much of it strictly nominal, amounted to
almost 100 times the actual profit earned from the mines
in 1914. "•
Needless to say, most of the money made in this era
found its way to the pockets of stock-jobbers and
financial swindlers. Without underestimating the
importance of this stratum of capitalist activity, it is
also necessary to recognise that nonetheless the speculation
ultimately gambled on the real possibilities of Nigerian
mining — the extent of the tinfield, the technical quality
of the deposits and the effect on the world market of
Nigerian tin export. A newly-discovered minesfield in
colonial Africa was especially susceptible to wild, uncer-
tain speculation precisely becaase of the absence of
"normal" conditions of capitalist reproduction and
production. Indeed similar booms and speculative invest-
ment cycles had already taken place with regard to gold
mining in the Gold Coast, Rhodesia and, above,all, South
Africa.
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In the slip between investment and production, two
historical actors were of central importance in colonial
Northern Nigeria before World War I: the British colonial
state and the Niger Company, the dominant trading firm in
the region. The role of the state was absolutely vital in
the creation of the tin mines or, to put it more accurately,
the capitalist take-over of the mines. In my recent book,
I explore that role in terms of the most salient concrete
imperatives:
"1) the violent conquest of the Jos Plateau to
prevent the indigenous population from inter-
fering with the recovery and transport of tin,
2) the complete dismantling of the native
Nigerian tin industry, 3) the creation of a
large force of labour prepared to sell their
labour power for at least a portion of the year
to mining capital, 4) the provision of an
extensive market in foodstuffs to feed this new
work-force on the Plateau, 5) collusion to keep
labour cheap, both from the point of view of
world competition in the production and the
establishment of a low common wage rate in the
protectorate of Northern Nigeria, 6) construction
of a railway, both to increase the speed at which
tin could be transported from Nigeria and to
enable a far larger amount of tin to be transported
than the supply of human (and animal) labour in the
country permitted and 7) the establishment of
legislation dispossessing the local population
of land and water rights in particular and creating
the possibility of capitalist enterprise in
general."
I do not wish to repeat the development of this argument
in any detail here except to state certain points that may
be derived from it. The first is the centrality of prizing
loose labour on a massive scale from a pre-capitalist
social formation where wage labour existed only marginally.
Labour needs (and the cost of labour power) lay at the
centre of most of the problems encountered in establishing
the mining industry. This required the coercive power of
a determined state initially and the setting forth of fiscal
policies that would ultimately create a large labour market,
free in the capitalist sense in that it was forced to
procure cash for survival.
The labour needs of the tin mines were immense; before
the railway arrived, more than 12,000 porters were required
to bring tin to the railhead.5 A porter could bear a
head-load of approximately sixty pounds but he could not
be expected to carry metal every day of the year and the
chairman of the Niger Company, Lord Scarbrough, estimated
that the maximum tin that could be exported purely by head-
load was 500 tons p.a.G Yet despite the urgent necessity
Niger-van Tin Mining and Imperialism
for a railroad, no private company was seriously interested
in building one. It was the state alone which could
appropriate the necessary land rights and coerce the so-
called "political labour" to construct it.
A second point which deserves stress because it is often
neglected in studies of colonial rule in Africa was the
importance of establishing a legal framework in which
enterprise could operate. The British state in Northern
Nigeria vested in itself the right to all land, justifying
its actions through a strange mixture of force majeure ,
the claim that this represented the correct interpretation
of Northern Nigerian Islamic custom and an acceptance of the
dubious treaties purportedly signed by the emirs and
representatives of the Royal Niger Company. This gave the
state the right to authorise the expropriation of land and
water for mining purposes, subject to compensation payments
which were very nominal before World War II and handed,
in any case, to chiefs dependent on the colonial regime
for their jobs.
Mining companies were not, however, permitted to own
land in freehold; they could only obtain ninety-nine
year leases through the offices of the inspectorate of
mines. The government was eager to minimise the amount of
land alienated and imposed limits on the size of the
leases. It was also keen to prevent land from being held
for speculative purposes only or worked inefficiently.
As a result, a company had first to acquire a mining lease
and show that it had satisfactorily proved the ground before
an EPL (exclusive prospecting licence) was granted. Even
then, a company was required to demonstrate that a minimum
of labour had been exerted on the EPL property to hold onto
it. This "labour obligation" in fact proved extremely
difficult to enforce. The minerals ordinance also
discriminated racially, in insisting that the manager on
the spot of a mining operation be a European. This bit of
overt racism was eliminated from the statutes in 1926 but
it was only after World War II that Nigerian petty bour-
geois began to acquire EPLs. It was only on possession
of an EPL that an individual or firm held the right to
export tin ore to Europe, Nigerian smelters having been
forcibly shut down by 1918.7
In this context, the social character of production
needs at least some reference. Before World War I, the
technical conditions of mining, despite the great extension
of activity, were relatively unchanged. Operations were
alluvial with traditional prospecting, carrying and washing
techniques dominant. New discoveries depended very largely
on skilled African prospectors. Apart from the railway,
capitalist control of tin mining largely meant coercive
control over land and export rights with little direct
intervention in the production process. Indeed one can
legitimately argue that with the divorce from local smithing
and the ban on local smelting, production became more
technically backward than before from a territorial
perspective.
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If capital was eminently successful in procuring labour,
it had little effective control over that labour.
Collusive efforts to push down wages before World War I
failed. The hiring of gangs was in the hands of African
contractors who alone knew the strength and numbers of the
workforce. European supervision was immensely expensive
and kept necessarily to a minimum.
These circumstances were ideal for an apparently
paradoxical situation: the dominance of an old West
African trading firm, the Niger Company, on the minesfield
despite the fact that the company did not divert itself
wholeheartedly into a mining operation. Until 1899, the
company had a royal charter possessing governmental autho-'.
rity. Through some hard and rather questionable bargaining,
the British state bought out the sovereignty rights of the
company, which ceased being "royal". It was thereby able
to reduce its share capital from El.lm. to £319,000, which
brought up profits as a percentage of capital invested
from 2.8% in 1897 to 13.4% in 1899 and 19.4% in 1900 (over
20% in 1904 and 1906).e
Perhaps the most notorious aspect of Sir George
Goldie's 1890 deal with the state concerned the company's
supposed rights in Northern Nigeria. These were part of
dubious treaties whose legitimacy was in turn used to
justify the legitimacy of British rule. As a result, the
state was therefore to pay the Niger Company half of all
royalties, licence fees, rentals, etc. derived from mines
in Northern Nigeria for 99 years. The company (and the
successor United Africa Company collected royalties until
bought out by the Nigerian government at the beginning of
1950. The total sum including the final sum paid out,
amounted to over £3m.
Without minimising the significance of the royalty
arrangement, it should not be allowed to obscure the
importance of the Niger Company in other aspects of tin
mining. Much of the impetus for this came from the Agent-
General Walter Watts, who interested himself early in
mining possibilities and secured a personal 15% commission
on development of the tinfield. Watts then went to Sir
Frederick Lugard, the man the government had entrusted with
the conquest of the North and secured the private promise
of a large concession of land for the company after the
conquest.9 Lugard acted on this promise in 1902 following
the Morland expedition which subjugated Bauchi.10 In fact,
rival claims by then existed but, through its close links
to Lugard, the Niger Company was able to prevail or buy them
out. Its greatest rival was Sir William Wallace, formerly
a company employee and now Acting Commissioner of Northern
Nigeria. Wallace knew the area well and may have been the
first Briton to discern the importance of the Benue tin
trade in the 1880s. At first, he came to terms with the
company, probably to his advantage. When he pressed a
valuable claim in 1905 in the name of his brother-in-law,
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the company cried scandal and had both the claim
excised and Wallace ultimately removed from office.
By this time, the Niger Company had done much to
investigate the prospects of Nigerian tin deposits and
systematically established its right to extensive
sections of land. The British government was flooded
with conflicting and unsurveyed claims and was obliged
to reorganise the minesfield and establish a land system
from 1909. The pre-eminent role of the company,
represented from 1903 by H W Laws, a mining engineer
whom Europeans liked to call the "uncrowned king of
the Plateau" was recognised and it received much the
best of the early mining licences and then EPLs. The
company had no right directly to sell this access to
land; however it was able to use its blocking power
to transfer the best pieces to producing mining
companies for handsome considerations. As a result, the
Niger Company earned large profits and special dividends
following 1910. By the end of 1911, mining profits
had reached £189,881 in cash, double the total outlay
spent to that time.11 Moreover, the company had
extensive shares in the most successful firms and the
director, Lord Scarbrough, had a seat on the board of
many of them.
The Niger Company had, moreover, used to its
advantage the commanding situation it held in internal
transport. It served as the miners' transporter and
purveyor of all supplies, organising the porterage
before the coming of the railway. It offered transport
rates only over the entire distance from Jos, the centre
of the Plateau minesfield companies, to Liverpool. At
least one plan to form a rival transport system by
producers failed as the Niger Company raised and lowered
prices to fit the need of stifling competition.12 It
also provided the tools and other stores required on the
Plateau and often established monopoly rights to
canteens in the camps.13 The Plateau became a major
sales outlet for it. One has as well to consider the
profits that accrued to the company from the dependence
of many miners on its engineering department's services.
These were organised as Laws, Rumbold & Co. in 1914.1"
Most importantly, the Niger Company provided for the
basic financial needs of the cash economy of the
minesfield. In this period, there was only one bank in
Nigeria, the Bank of British West Africa, controlled
by the company's great antagonist, Elder Dempster, the
shipping firm. The Niger Company moved by 1910 into
the business of discounting for the Plateau firms at the
rate of 21%, a particularly profitable business for
them.ls The sum of cash advances provided mainly for
wages rose from £93,031 in 1911 to £308,672 in 1913.
It was entirely appropriate that the Niger Company was
the main force behind the creation of a Chamber of
Mines in Jos in 1910 and its reorganisation as a branch
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of the Nigerian Chamber of Mines in London in 1912, the
London chamber having at its head through these years none
other than Lord Scarbrough.L6
What we can gather from the situation of the Niger
Company in the early phase of capitalist tin mining in
Nigeria is a picture of the transitional character of
capital penetration in West Africa even under the aegis of
colonial conquest. The transformation of social and
economic conditions that was required was enormous and,
to the extent that it could be minimised for the time being,
the older merchant firm was able to achieve a striking, if
temporary domination. This in turn reflected the continued
domination of pre-capitalist social relationships in the
production process, not yet subordinated more closely to
the needs of capitalist circulation.
On the eve of World War I, the Niger Company greatly
extended its capitalisation. The war, after great initial
strains, brought substantial profits as commodities became
scarcer in Europe. The price of tin rose to unprecedented
heights and tin assumed a larger and larger share in
company profits and company financial commitments. These
favourable conditions prevailed as well immediately after
the war, when the price of tin reached unprecedented
heights. The more spectacular then was the fall. By the
time the bottom fell out of the tin market in the middle
of 1920, the Niger Company was no more, forced to sell out
as agricultural produce prices collapsed, to the firm of
Lever Brothers, which had built an empire around the sale
of soap.17 Lord Leverhulme had a passionate interest in
Africa based on his conviction that Lever had to move into
the field of direct production of the tropical oils on
which its products were based. He had no interest, however,
in the Niger Company's mining interests.
The Niger Company section of Lever Brothers (Unilever
after merger with the Dutch margarine trusts) was renamed
the United Africa Company. Absorbing several rival trading
firms, it came to occupy as dominant a role in the Nigerian
economy as ever the Niger Company had. From the Niger
Company, the UAC inherited the royalty share benefits from
mining. It sought to divest these in vain. It was the
state which was unprepared to pay the price the company
asked.18 The UAC also continued to retain an important
position on the Plateau as general wholesaler and retailer.
However, as prosperity returned to the tin mining industry in
the mid-1920s, it was determined to sell all remaining
mining property.
At this time, the Nigerian tinfield was divided into
many small operations. In 1920, the last overall profitable
year before the slump, declared profits had been £472,000 but
this was divided between 105 operators, averaging a mere
£4495.19 It was now realised clearly that Nigeria was no
rival to Malaya as the world's premier source of tin.
Nonetheless, prospecting had revealed the presence of impor-
tant deposits in fossil riverbeds that contained substantial
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amounts of tin ore but required the removal of an overburden
of at least thirty to seventy feet. This in turn created
the problem of intensified mechanical application and the
introduction of electric power to mining.
Even before World War I, hydro-electric power appeared
to hold some of the answers to the technical problems of
the minesfield, as opposed to expensive imported oil and
inefficient Nigerian coal. Plans to harness the fall of
water from the Plateau escarpment proceeded slowly. The
most ambitious firm was the Northern Nigeria (Bauchi)
Company which obtained an option from Lord Lugard in
1917 for the construction of a hydro-electric plant at
Kwall Falls, the rapids of the Ngell river.20 These plans
were put into abeyance during the 1920-22 slump but
afterwards resumed on the basis of new negotiations with
the government. The Kwall plant was finally opened in
July, 1925. Despite its cost of some £250,000 it
represented a profitable and important advance. Now
imported machinery could be harnessed to producing tin
ore at costs, on favourable ground, as low as in virtually
any tin mines in the world. The water supply trapped by
the plant allowed mine operations to continue throughout
the year and the mid-1920s witnessed a spate of machine
imports that brought total application to 6,300 horse-
power in 1926 and 12,000 in 1928. In its wake, the machin-
ery was accompanied by a large number of skilled workmen
and entrepreneurs who established workshops in Jos, Bukuru
and other major Plateau settlements. Conditions now had
been created through which an interested capitalist bloc
could take over the lion's share of tin production in
Nigeria on the basis of controlling the production process
itself.
The successful candidate for this position was a trust
formed in Britain in 1926 under the direction of John
Howeson called Anglo-Oriental. Anglo-Oreintal had its
central sphere of operations in Malayan tin mining. At
the beginning of the 1920s, some two-thirds of Malayan
production still remained in the hands of Chinese capital,
although British capital dominated both smelting and
financing. This picture changed dramatically while total
production and productivity mounted through the introduction
of expensive dredges, giant earth-moving machinery that
created artificial pools allowing the electrically-operated
shovels to work in slush, rather than hard ground. The
dredge transformed tin mining in Malaya, the world's number
one producer, but at the cost of making mining a substan-
tially more capital- intensive industry and, as a consequence,
especially sensitive to the trade cycle. Howeson's Anglo-
Oriental companies came to control some one-third of Malayan
production in the last years of the decade.
His position became even more formidable when he esta-
blished an alliance with Antonia Patino, the dour Bolivian
clerk who became the wealthiest Third World entrepreneur
of his day. Patino's Bolivian mines were at that time
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the principal tin mining operation in the world based on
underground techniques. The seams were at first very rich
but production costs in the Bolivian Andes were also high
and, as Bolivian production expanded in the 1920s, the
quality of the rock declined and dependence on high prices
for tin grew. By this time, Patino had diversified his
interests from Bolivian mining to British smelting. The
expansion of tin smelting during and after World War I
created excessive capacity that pointed as well in the
direction of extensive production and high prices.
The shadow that loomed over Howeson and Patino was
that of the 1920-22 slump, when tin prices had fallen
drastically. At the time, the biggest British producers
in Malaya had secured the consent of the colonial regime
there to work for production cuts. This expanded into
an agreement with the government of the Netherlands East
Indies to create what was known as the Bandung pool.
For Anglo-Oriental, this had been a highly promising
initiative which needed reconsideration when prices fell
again. The Bandung Pool had embraced only the Netherlands
East Indies and Malaya. Nigeria had stood outside it, as
had Bolivia. The 1920s witnessed a dramatic extension of
world tin production (including a 70% increase in Nigeria)
and any fields were being brought into operation in Siam
and the Belgian Congo, both with richer reserves than those
known for Nigeria.
Thus the interest of Anglo-Oriental in Nigeria was
essentially twofold. Primarily, its concern was control
over world production with a view to influencing the price
of tin. Throughout the 1920s, its trade journal, Tin,
began each issue with the exhortation that the trend in
base metals prices must always be upwards. As one enemy
of this empire wrote "... the financial stability of the
tin trusts was dependent on the realisation of the
expectations of the boom years, and this involved a price
above £200 per ton."21 The essence of the Patino-Anglo-
Oriental alliance lay in the effort to preserve the value
of money capital which stood as their financial scaffolding.22
Secondarily there was Anglo-Oriental's interest in heavy
machine production and the consequent technical potential
for this in Nigeria,, although it provedto.be far less than
in the case of Malaya, was unfolding in the middle 1920s.
Anglo-Oriental's principal rival was Herbert George
Latilla, an Englishman who had emigrated to Rhodesia in
the 1890s, gone into gold mining speculation and eventually
established ties with Rhodes' old company, Consolidated
Gold Mines of South Africa, and in particular with Sir
Abe Bailey. Unlike other Rand ventures of its day.
Consolidated was not sanguine about long-term prospects
on its properties and tried from an early date to develop
mining interests in other parts of the world and notably
in Africa. It had interests in the Nigerian tinfield from
at least 1910 and the possibilities for expansion in the
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1920s seemed attractive. It was Latilla who bought out
the last remaining Niger Company properties in 1925. Two
years later, he successfully negotiated with the state for
new hydro-electric works at Kurra Falls, which could make
his Ropp Company the base for a strong position on the
south - western Plateau.
By this time, Anglo-Oriental had entered the Nigerian
lists, establishing Associated Tin Mines of Nigeria to
acquire its first local companies in 1926. The following
year it bought out Northern Nigeria (Bauchi) with effective
control over Kwall Falls. By the time a new set of com-
panies were consolidated into the London Tin Corporation
in 1929, its position was commanding. Kurra Falls dam
was completed the next year but by then Latilla had been
brought to terms. He received a seat on the new Nigerian
Electric Supply Company board, while Howeson became a
director of Consolidated Gold and Consolidated bought
Anglo-Oriental shares.23 Anglo-Oriental then controlled
some 40% of Nigerian production and 90% of hydroelectric
power based production but it was only after the Depression,
the consequently successful tin withholding practices put
into action and the unprecedented boom of the middle 1930s
that these operations were all consolidated into the
Amalgamated Tin Mines of Nigeria, for some twenty years
the largest single tin mining company in the world. At
this stage, expansion ceased and the ATMN share of
Nigerian tin production remained the same from the initial
formation of the company to the 1970s. Middle producers,
such as Latilla's Gold and Base Metal Mining Corporation,
accounted between them for a similar proportion of total
mining while "private miners", petty capitalists, dominated
speculative and marginal holdings.
It is not proposed in this paper to consider later
developments. Unquestionaly the emergence of ATMN marked
the achievement of a certain level of maturity in capitalist
mining in Nigeria. Production was far more directly
penetrated by capitalist methods. ironically this presented
serious difficulties for the future of the industry. When
wages were driven down to the remarkable lows of the
Depression, machine application diminished and expensive
equipment was left to rust, unable to compete with
miserably paid Nigerian labour. Tin production control
tilted the balance in the commerce of Northern Nigeria
towards peasant crop production more heavily than before.
This highlights the still tentative character of capita-
list production in the country and the subordination of
that production to pre-capitalist forms and conditions on
Nigerian terrain. By the 1920s, after a generation of
British domination, conditions for capitalist production
and the direct intervention of finance capital were ripe
on the Nigerian minesfield. The rise of Anglo-Oriental
marked this intervention in the form of subordination
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to the financial needs of a transnational corporation for
which Nigerian mining operations were only a branch in
an overall system that dictated local development in tin
mining until the coming of national independence in 1960
and, to a large extent, afterwards. The strong extra-
verted orientation and enclave character of mining develop-
ment has to be related to the overall social conditions
for production in Nigeria and their gradual transformation
This in turn provides the concrete context that needs to
be studied in developing a theoretical approach to the
history of capitalist development and imperialism in
West Africa.
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